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Evil and the Evidence for God: The Challenge of John Hick's Theodicy, by R.
Douglas Geivett. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1993. Pp.
xii and 276. $44.95 (Cloth), $24.95 (Paper).
MICHAEL BERGMANN, University of Notre Dame
It may come as somewhat of a surprise to learn that nearly half of a book
on John Hick's response to the problem of evil is devoted to defending
natural theology. But according to Geivett, the main weakness of Hick's
theodicy is its failure to acknowledge and depend on the successes of
natural theology. Thus, Geivett treats the twin tasks of critiquing Hick's
soul-making theodicy and responding to Hick's downplaying of theistic
argument as parts of a single project: arguing in favour of a return to
the Augustinian tradition in theodicy.
There are three parts to Geivetf s book (as well as an afterword by
Hick). In the first part, Geivett introduces the problem of evil and presents both the traditional Augustinian response as well as Hick's soulmaking theodicy. The remainder of the book follows the outline established by the four main headings under which Geivett analyzes Hick's
theodicy in part I: epistemology, the subject of part II, and teleology,
anthropology and eschatology which are considered in part III.
In part II of the book, Geivett contends that natural theology plays a
crucial role in responding to the problem of evil. He notes that the current trend of classifying responses to the problem of evil as either
defences (which show that the existence of God is compatible with the
existence of evil) or theodicies (which attempt to provide plausible reasons God might have for allowing evil) neglects a third alternative
which he endorses: that of showing that it is rational to believe that the
traditional Christian God exists and, therefore, that God must have a
good reason for allowing evil even if we have no idea what that reason
might be. Geivett maintains that if theistic belief is to be rational, it must
be based on theistic arguments and not merely on religious experience.
He takes several chapters to present and defend an argument for the
existence of God which (he claims) establishes that a rational person
should believe that the universe had an absolute beginning, that this
beginning had a nonnatural cause and that this nonnatural cause is personal, very powerful and good.
Part III deals with Hick's theodicy proper. Geivett's main objection to
the teleology in Hick's theodicy has to do with Hick's claim that fulfillment of God's purpose of soul-making requires that humans be created
morally imperfect. In connection with the anthropological aspects of his
theodicy, Geivett's focus is Hick's view of human freedom which
Geivett thinks is incoherent (p. 203). And with respect to the eschatological dimension of Hick's theodicy, Geivett's primary contention is that
God's guaranteeing that all humans will eventually freely respond to him
in love would preclude human freedom.
There is much that is interesting and provocative in Geivett's book:
his identification of a response to the problem of evil that is neither a
defence nor a theodicy, his use of natural theology in responding to the
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problem of evil and certain of his objections to points in Hick's theodicy.
But there is also much about the book that seems problematic. I will
begin my discussion of the book's difficulties by considering Geivett's
claim to be advocating a return to an Augustinian theodicy. My remaining comments fall under Geivett's headings of epistemology, anthropology and eschatology.
1. Is Geivett defending an Augustinian theodicy (using 'theodicy'
broadly here to refer to all theistic responses to the problem of evil)?
This is the stated purpose of his book. Nevertheless, there are two reasons to doubt that this is what he does. First, he believes that strong
dependence on the success of theistic arguments is essential to the
Augustinian tradition in theodicy. But it is questionable, as Geivett himself recognizes (p. 240, fn. 5), whether Augustine himself considered natural theology crucial to the enterprise of formulating a theodicy. Geivett
is correct in pointing out (pp. 11-12) that, in responding to the problem
of evil, Augustine emphasized the importance of first believing that God
exists. But it is doubtful that Augustine thought this belief must be
established by theistic argument if it is to be rational.' It seems, therefore, that insofar as Geivett is advocating the need to employ natural
theology, he is defending only a particular (and currently unpopular)
version of the Augustinian tradition in theodicy, not Augustinian theodicy simpliciter.
Furthermore, Geivett's theodicy differs from Augustinian theodicies
in that it does not rely on a free will defence in the way Augustinian
theodicies characteristically do. Geivett thinks that Alvin Plantinga's
response to the logical problem of evil as posed by J.L. Mackie fails
(more on this below). Geivett's response to Mackie is to acknowledge
that God could have weakly actualized 2 a world in which humans were
free and never did wrong; nevertheless, God chose instead to weakly
actualize a world in which humans did wrong so that they could have
"dignity" (pp. 197-200). This dignity is a result of our realizing the value
of freedom through experiencing wrongdoing and thereby understanding more fully the momentousness of our choices. Thus, in Geivett's
theodicy, God chose to weakly actualize a world including human
wrongdoing rather than a world without it not because that would make
it possible to create beings with free will but because that would make it
possible to create beings with dignity.
2. Epistemology. Here I want to comment both on Geivett's argument
for the existence of God and on his claim that experience-based belief in
God cannot be used in responding to the problem of evil in the way natural theology can. Geivett draws attention (pp. 105-109) to the implausibility of Mackie's claim that no explanation is required for the beginning
of the universe (Mackie says the universe might just have popped into
existence out of nothing). But nowhere does he attack Hick's point that it
is rational to think that no explanation is required for the existence of an
eternal universe. 3 This serves to highlight the fact that Geivett's theistic
argument crucially depends on whether or not the universe had an
absolute beginning. He says the weight of scientific opinion strongly
supports the view that it did but he concedes that there are those who opt
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for a beginningless universe undergoing an infinite series of expansions
and contractions; Hick, in the afterword, says that this latter theory is
currently considered more likely. Regardless of whether it is Geivett or
Hick who is right about contemporary scientific opinion, this sort of evidence seems like a slender reed on which to hang the rationality of belief
in God. Who knows what scientific opinion on such matters will be in
twenty years? This may be why Geivett also provides a philosophical
argument that the universe had a beginning. The gist of the argument is
that the universe could not have existed for an infinite amount of time.
For if it did, an infinite sequence of moments would have come to an end
in the present moment which is impossible because an infinite sequence
can have no end. This last assumption seems to me to be quite controversial. We might concede that an infinite sequence with a beginning can
have no end. But must we conclude the same with respect to a beginningless infinite sequence? I think not. All infinite sequence of moments with
no end can have a beginning; likewise, it seems that an infinite sequence
of moments with no beginning can have an end. Objections to there
being an actual infinite may have some force. But not enough to establish
that a rational person should deny the possibility of an actual infinite and,
therefore, believe that the universe had a beginning.
This is just one weak point in Geivett's overall theistic argument.
There are others. For example, in his argument for the goodness of the
cause of the universe he explicitly assumes that whatever is caused by a
personal agent powerful enough to cause the beginning of the universe
is intended by that agent (p. 126). But must we just assume that the universe, if created, was not created by one of Hume's infant deities who
are prone to do things which have consequences they do not intend?' If
so, Geivett does not say why. And if Geivett's argument fails at even
one of its stages, his overall argument fails to establish that a rational
person should believe that a good, powerful, personal God exists. This
is not to suggest that natural theology is of no value. But, so far as I can
tell, the weakness of Geivett's theistic argument simply confirms the
widely held view that we cannot expect natural theology to establish
that theism is rational and atheism is not.
According to Geivett, if it is rational to believe that God exists, it is
rational to believe that he has some plausible reason for allowing evil,
even if we do not know what that reason is. One would think that Hick
could agree with Geivett here even though he accounts for the rationality
of belief in God by means of religious experience, not theistic arguments.
But Geivett doesn't want to leave this avenue open for Hick. He argues
that the natural theologian can properly ignore the problem of evil in formulating a cosmological argument since the beginning of the universe
requires an explanation whether or not evil exists. Once the natural theologian successfully argues that God exists, this conclusion can be taken
for granted in dealing with other issues such as the problem of evil (pp.
81-86). But Hick, according to Geivett, cannot ignore the problem of evil
in his explanation of the rationality of religious belief because religious
experience is on an equal footing with experience of evil and the latter
"cancels out the prima facie evidence for religious belief" (p. 80).
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I find this analysis of the situation quite implausible. It is better to
think (as Geivett sometimes does) in terms of beliefs and defeaters for
beliefs (where what gets defeated is the rationality of a belief). Suppose
someone rationally believes in the existence of God before encountering
the problem of evil in a powerful way. Could the rationality of such a
belief be defeated by experiencing evil? It seems that it could. But
whether or not it is depends on how strongly the person rationally
believes that God exists and how strongly the experience of evil rationally suggests to that person that God does not exist. It does not depend on
whether or not one's belief in God is based on theistic arguments. For it
may be that a person rationally believes in God with only a small degree
of confidence on the basis of natural theology. This sort of belief will be
easily defeated if the experience of evil strongly suggests to the person
that God does not exist. Likewise, it may be that a person rationally
believes in God with an extremely high degree of confidence on the
basis of experience (perhaps Moses did). The rationality of this sort of
belief will not be so easily defeated by experience of evil. If this way of
looking at the matter is correct, Geivett is mistaken when he in effect
denies that experience of evil can defeat the rationality of belief in God
based on theistic arguments. And he needs to say much more in defence
of his claim that experience of evil will always defeat the rationality of
belief in God based on religious experience.
3. Anthropology. The weakest part of the book is Geivett's discussion
of Plantinga's response to Mackie on the logical problem of evil. This
discussion reflects negatively on other things Geivett says about human
freedom because it brings into question his understanding of the issues
involved. The main problem is that he thinks the point underlying
Plantinga's response to Mackie is the following:
(1) It is logically possible in all possible worlds with significantly
free creatures that at least one free creature will freely go wrong
with respect to some moral choice, such that any such world
will contain a modicum of moral evil (p. 198).
(1) says that all possible worlds with significantly free creatures include
at least one creature which could freely choose evil. That Plantinga
accepts this is true but not that interesting. It just follows from his definition of significant freedom.5 It certainly is not the point underlying his
free will defence. Furthermore, (1) also says that all worlds containing at
least one creature which could freely choose evil thereby contain a modicum of evil (whether or not the creature actually does any evil). But this
is extremely odd; neither Plantinga nor anyone else I know of thinks a
world contains evil simply in virtue of its containing free creatures.
But perhaps Geivett didn't mean to attribute (1) as stated to
Plantinga. Since Geivett intended (1) to express the point underlying
Plantinga's free will defence, I think what he meant to say is that
Plantinga is committed to the following:
(1') It is logically possible that in all possible worlds with signifi-
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cantly free creatures at least one free creature will freely go
wrong with respect to some moral choice, such that any such
world will contain a modicum of moral evil.
(Note that the only difference between (1) and (1') is that the first 'that' is
shifted.) But Plantinga explicitly denies (1') when he concedes Mackie's
point that there are worlds with free creatures none of whom goes
wrong with respect to any action. The point underlying Plantinga's
response to Mackie is, rather, that:
(2) It is logically possible that in all possible worlds which God
could weakly actualize with significantly free creatures at least one
free creature will freely go wrong with respect to some moral
choice. 6
The distinction between (1') and (2) is perhaps the crucial distinction in
Plantinga's response to the logical problem of evil. And it is because
Geivett (apparently) misses this distinction that he opts for the unusual
conclusion that God chose not to weakly actualize a world with free creatures none of whom ever does wrong even though he could have done so
(see my discussion under point 1. above). There are several other problems in the neighborhood of this discussion which betray further misunderstanding (see especially p. 197) but I won't discuss them here.
4. Eschatology. Finally, I want simply to note with respect to the problem of hell what Mackie noted concerning the problem of evil generally.
Surely it is logically possible that all free creatures freely respond to God
in love at some point before death or in the afterlife and thereby avoid
an endless hell. Why couldn't God weakly actualize that state of affairs
by creating only those free beings which his middle knowledge reveals
would eventually freely respond to him in love? Plantinga's trans world
depravity response could not be easily modified to deal with this question. For according to traditional Christian theism, the actual world
includes some free creatures who do in fact freely respond to God in
love and thereby avoid hell whereas it does not include any free creatures who in fact never do wrong. So the analogue of the possibility of
universal transworld depravity (universal transworld obduracy?) is not
available as a Christian response. This follow-up on Mackie's point suggests that Geivett is wrong to say that God could not guarantee that no
one remains forever in hell without forfeiting creaturely freedom; for
God could (it seems) weakly actualize a world in which all free creatures
eventually freely respond to him in love (before death or in the afterlife).
I find it puzzling that Hick does not avail himself of this defence of the
compatibility of universalism and human freedom.
Obviously there is much in Geivett's book with which I disagree.
Nevertheless, I believe his focus on natural theology and its connection
with the problem of evil is worthy of our consideration. Geivett's critique of Hick's views is an original and valuable contribution to the literature on the soul-making tradition in theodicy.
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NOTES
1. See for example De Utilitate Credendi in Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed.
and trans. by J.HS. Burleigh (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953), especially pp. 311-316 (paragraphs 24-29) where Augustine argues for the appropriateness of belief in God that is not based on reason.
*
2. God weakly actualizes a state of affairs S if and* only if (i) God causes S
and all contingent states of affairs included in S to be actual and (ii) S*
counterfactually implies S.
3. Geivett sometimes wrongly assumes that Hick's point is the same as
Mackie's (pp. 141-45). For Hick's own statement see his An Interpretation of
Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989), p. 80 and Arguments for the Existence of God (New York: Herder
and Herder, 1971), pp. 34-35 (see also the afterword in Geivett's book, p.
232).
4. See David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman
Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1947), p. 169.
5. The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 166.
6. The Nature of Necessity, pp. 184-190.

Gambling on God: Essays on Pascal's Wager, edited by Jeff Jordan.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994. Pp. viii and
168. $49.00 (Cloth), $19.95 (Paper).
JOSHUA L. GOLDING, Bellarmine College
This book is a collection of very good essays on Pascal's Wager. As
far as I know, it is the first collection of its kind, and it is long overdue.
Advanced undergraduates will find most of the essays readable and
enlightening; graduate students and scholars will also find it very useful, at least as a starting point in their study of secondary literature on
the Wager.
The back cover advertises that the book includes "new and classic
essays." In the editor's introduction there is no indication of which are
new or classic. The reader is left to assume from the notes (or lack thereof) to each essay that the first two have already appeared; the third is
based on material in an earlier book and the remaining six are apparently new. At least one of the "classic" essays (Ryan) is abridged; yet the
innocent reader would not necessarily know this. But this is not at all to
imply that the abridgement was unsuitable for this volume. Also, some
of the "new" essays are not terribly new, but based to a large extent on
older material. This is especially the case with the articles by Schlesinger
and Jordan. Again, this is not a major complaint, since the goal of the
book is to bring together in one volume some of the finer and more
accessible work on the Wager. In any case, it appears that three of the
essays-by Quinn, McClennen and Sorenson-are entirely new and represent genuine contributions to the literature on the Wager.

